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“Neither a borrower nor a lender be”
Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 3, 75
Abstract
Peters [2011a] defined an optimal leverage which maximizes the time-
average growth rate of an investment held at constant leverage. We test
the hypothesis that this optimal leverage is attracted to 1, such that
leveraging an investment in the market portfolio cannot yield long-run
outperformance. Historical data support the hypothesis. This places a
strong constraint on the stochastic properties of traded assets, which we
call “leverage efficiency.” Market conditions that deviate from leverage
efficiency are unstable and may create leverage-driven bubbles. This result
resolves the equity premium puzzle, informs interest rate setting, and
constitutes a theory of noise in financial markets.
1 Introduction
In section 2 we summarize a few key properties of geometric Brownian mo-
tion that were pointed out in [Peters, 2011a]. We indicate the main elements
of the analogy that is often drawn between this and the dynamics of markets.
Section 3 introduces the concept of leverage efficiency, namely the hypothesis
that the properties of price fluctuations in real markets are strongly constrained
by efficiency arguments so as to make investments of leverage 1 optimal. This
hypothesis is motivated by the considerations in section 2 but goes beyond
the simple model discussed there. Section 4 constitutes the main body of the
study, where the hypothesis is tested empirically using data from American
stock markets. The arguments leading to the hypothesis are neither specific to
the mathematical model nor to American stock markets. We choose the model
because it is a relevant and analytically tractable limiting case, and American
stock markets because they have been well observed for a sufficiently long time
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to test the hypothesis. The arguments are robust enough to yield insights into
other assets, such as houses, or indeed national economies or the global economy.
Section 5 concludes that optimal leverage is empirically close to 1, as predicted
by leverage efficiency. We summarize example applications of this fundamental
constraint on the stochastic properties of price dynamics: a resolution of the
equity premium puzzle, a protocol for central bank rate setting to avoid lever-
age bubbles, and an explanation of asset price changes in the absence of new
information.
2 Mathematical background
Notation: The present study uses three different levels of realism. To avoid
tedious nomenclature and confusion between these, we use three different su-
perscripts:
1. superscript m refers to the mathematical toy model used to motivate and
guide our investigations;
2. superscript d refers to data analyses performed to test our main hypothesis
empirically; and
3. superscript r refers to corresponding quantities in the context of real peo-
ple’s behavior.
Toy model: The variable x(t) is said to undergo geometric Brownian motion
if it obeys the Itoˆ stochastic differential equation,
dx(t) = x(t)(µmdt+ σmdW ), (1)
where t denotes time, dt its infinitesimal increment, and dW the normally dis-
tributed Wiener increment, dW ∼ N (0, dt). We call µm the drift and σm the
volatility.
We pause here to make an important distinction between averaging over an
ensemble and averaging over time. For some special observables, this distinc-
tion is unimportant because they have the following ergodic property [Peters
and Gell-Mann, 2016]:
Equality of averages
The expectation value of the observable is a constant (independent of time) and
the finite-time average of the observable converges to this constant with proba-
bility one as the averaging time tends to infinity.
The observable x(t) defined by equation (1) does not possess this property.
Therefore, we cannot assume that the expectation value 〈x(t)〉 will be infor-
mative of what happens to x(t) over time. From now on we will refer to the
expectation value as the “ensemble average” because it has little to do with the
everyday meaning of the word “expect,” whereas it is by definition the average
over an ensemble of systems.
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Consider the growth rate estimator,
ĝm(∆t,N) ≡ 1
∆t
ln
(
1
N
N∑
i
(
xi(t+ ∆t)
xi(t)
))
, (2)
where i indexes realizations of the process described by equation (1) and ∆t is
a time increment. Taking the limit N →∞ for finite ∆t extracts the behavior
of the ensemble average, whereas taking the limit ∆t→∞ for finite N extracts
the long-time behavior [Peters and Klein, 2013]. This procedure yields clear
interpretations of two well-known characteristics of geometric Brownian motion:
gm〈〉 ≡ lim
N→∞
ĝm(∆t,N) = µm (3)
shows that the ensemble-average growth rate is equal to the drift; and
gmt ≡ lim
∆t→∞
ĝm(∆t,N) = µm − (σ
m)2
2
(4)
=
〈
∆ lnx
∆t
〉
(5)
shows that the long-time growth rate, i.e. what an individual will experience
eventually, is smaller by a correction term (σm)2/2. Equation (5), which shows
gmt as equal to the ensemble average of the rate of change ∆ lnx/∆t, is obtained
by applying Itoˆ’s formula to equation (1). Indeed, this rate of change is an
ergodic observable for the multiplicative dynamics defined by equation (1), as
discussed in [Peters and Gell-Mann, 2016].
Referring to the analogy with stock markets, it was pointed out in [Peters,
2011a] that an individual investor should be more concerned about gmt , the
long-time growth rate of a single realization of the process, than about gm〈〉 , the
growth rate of the average over parallel realizations which are inaccessible to
him, see also [Fernholz and Shay, 1982]. For historical reasons, however, gm〈〉 is
often mistakenly considered in the literature [Hughson et al., 2006].
We introduce a leverage parameter lm to extend the market analogy to lever-
aged investments. We imagine two assets available to an investor: one risk-
less, whose price xriskless(t) obeys equation (1) with drift µ
m
riskless and volatility
zero; and the other risky, whose price xrisky(t) obeys equation (1) with drift
µmriskless + µ
m
excess and volatility σ
m > 0. The investor has net resources of xl(t)
to allocate between these assets. A leveraged investment in the risky asset is, in
effect, a portfolio in which lmxl(t) is held in the risky asset and the remainder
(1− lm)xl is held in the riskless asset. Each holding achieves the same fractional
change – which we shall call the “return” – as its respective asset, so that the
total resources evolve as
dxl = (1− lm)xl
(
dxriskless
xriskless
)
+ lmxl
(
dxrisky
xrisky
)
(6)
= xl[(µ
m
riskless + l
mµmexcess)dt+ l
mσmdW ]. (7)
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The case lm = 0, in which the investor holds only the riskless asset, results
in deterministic exponential growth at a rate equal to the drift µmriskless. The
case lm = 1, in which the investor places all his resources in the risky asset, is
equivalent to equation (1), where µm = µmriskless + µ
m
excess.
We note that lm is constant in this setup. The fractional holdings in the
two assets do not change over time, even though the values of the holdings do
change. Unless lm = 0 or 1, when only one asset is present, this implies that the
portfolio is continuously rebalanced, i.e. resources are moved between the risky
and riskless assets to maintain the leverage at lm. In practice, such rebalancing
would take place only at finite time intervals and would incur transaction costs.
Such effects are included in our empirical work in section 4. Moreover, the
leveraged investments imagined in this study should not be confused with “buy-
and-hold” portfolios which start with an initial leverage and do not undergo
rebalancing. In general, the allocation of such portfolios will change over time.
We will think of the risky asset as resembling an investment in the market
portfolio and of the riskless asset as resembling a safe government bond or bank
deposit. Leverage lm < 0 reflects short-selling; 0 ≤ lm ≤ 1 reflects part of the in-
vestor’s equity being invested in the market and part kept safe accruing interest
at rate µmriskless; and l
m > 1 reflects what is commonly referred to as leveraging,
i.e. an investment in the market that exceeds the investor’s equity and includes
borrowed funds. The volatility in equation (7) is lmσm, proportional to the
leverage, and the drift is µmriskless + l
mµmexcess, reflecting a safe interest rate and
the excess drift of the market added in proportion to the leverage. Thus lever-
aging causes both the excess drift and the fluctuation amplitude to increase
linearly.
xl(t) in equation (7) has the leverage-dependent ensemble-average growth
rate
gm〈〉(l
m) = µmriskless + l
mµmexcess (8)
and the leverage-dependent time-average growth rate
gmt (l
m) = µmriskless + l
mµmexcess −
(lmσm)2
2
. (9)
Crucially equation (9), unlike equation (8), is not monotonic in lm. Maximizing
gmt (l
m) establishes the existence of an objectively optimal leverage:
lmopt =
µmexcess
(σm)2
. (10)
Equation (10) implies that, unless µmexcess/(σ
m)2 = 1, it is possible to choose
lm in equation (7) such that xl(t) (reflecting a leveraged investment) consis-
tently outperforms xrisky(t) in equation (1) (reflecting the market portfolio).
For example, 0 < lmopt < 1 would imply that, due to the nonlinear effects of
multiplicative fluctuations, a rising market could be beaten by keeping a fixed
fraction of one’s resources in a savings account.
In reality, the outcome of an investment held for some finite time ∆t is
given by the growth of the investment averaged over ∆t. The growth rate
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of the ensemble-average is a priori irrelevant in practice. Maximizing gm〈〉 in
equation (8) leads to the recommendation of maximizing lm (or −lm). But
equation (9) shows that this would lead to a negatively diverging time-average
growth rate, i.e. to ruin. Thus, if gm〈〉 (often called the “expected rate of return”)
is falsely believed to reflect the quantity an investor should optimize, and if lm
is interpreted as the leverage used in the investment, then the investor will be
led to exceed (positively or negatively) the leverage that would truly be most
beneficial. Worse, this excess is likely to ruin the investor.
The history of the struggle to make sense of the misleading recommendations
derived from equation (8) is the history of decision theory and of probability
theory itself, see [Peters, 2011b, Peters and Gell-Mann, 2016]. Under multiplica-
tive growth, such as in equation (1), the difference between the growth rate of
the ensemble average and the long-term growth rate of an individual trajectory
is the difference between arithmetic and geometric means. This was identified
in the context of a repeated gamble as early as [Whitworth, 1870], while the
correction term in its present form, −(σm)2/2, follows directly from [Itoˆ, 1944].
Optimal leverage for equation (7) was computed by [Kelly Jr., 1956] and in the
form of equation (10) by [Merton, 1969], although neither pointed to the non-
ergodicity of x(t) as the origin of their findings. The present study is concerned
with the dynamic properties of the optimal leverage observed in time series of
real markets.
3 Leverage efficiency
The efficient market hypothesis [Bachelier, 1900, Fama, 1965] claims that the
price of an asset traded in an efficient market reflects all the information publicly
available about the asset. The corollary is that it is impossible for a market
participant, without access to privileged (“insider”) information, consistently
to achieve growth at a rate exceeding the long-time growth rate of the market
(“to beat the market”) by trading assets. We shall refer to this concept as “price
efficiency.”
We propose a different, fluctuations-based, market efficiency, which we call
Leverage efficiency:
It is impossible for a market participant without privileged information to beat
the market by applying leverage.
Simple strategies such as borrowing money to invest, lr > 1, or keeping some
money in the bank, lr < 1, should not yield consistent market outperformance,
i.e. there should be no leverage-arbitrage. This reasoning was used in [Peters,
2011a] to hypothesize that real markets self-organize so that
lropt = 1 (11)
is an attractive point for their stochastic properties (represented by µmriskless,
µmexcess, and σ
m in the model).
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The hypothesis we are about to test is motivated by the model equation (7)
and its properties equation (8), equation (9), and equation (10), in the sense that
this model motivates the existence of an optimal leverage. But it is by no means
derived from the model, as the hypothesis requires the dynamic adjustment, or
self-organization, of the stochastic properties of the system, which, in the model,
are represented by fixed parameters. One would have to think of µmriskless, µ
m
excess,
and σm as slowly varying (compared to the fluctuations) functions of time,
related to one another as well as to lm through a dynamic which has lmopt =
µmexcess/(σ
m)2 = 1 as an attractor.
Although inspired by a mathematical toy model, the hypothesis in equa-
tion (11) does not rest on model-specific properties. Crucial for it are the
identification of the time-average growth rate and the consequent establishment
of an optimal leverage, about which economic arguments may be framed.
Leverage efficiency is a tantalizing concept. It posits that the market has a
different quality of knowledge than implied by price efficiency. Price efficiency
is essentially a static concept, as it states that prices coincide with some form
of value. Leverage efficiency, on the other hand, constrains price dynamics and
predicts properties of fluctuations.
To argue convincingly for leverage efficiency we must elucidate those aspects
of the dynamics which give rise to it. We propose a dynamical feedback in which
prices and their fluctuations respond to changes in optimal leverage, in a manner
reminiscent of the basic feedback between prices and supply-demand imbalances
familiar in economics. We augment this with criteria for global stability derived
from the “no leverage-arbitrage” argument. This mechanism, detailed below,
suggests that both lropt = 1 and l
r
opt = 0 are particularly attractive and that the
interval 0 ≤ lropt ≤ 1 constitutes a stable regime, whereas values outside it are
unstable.
1. Leverage feedbacks:
(a) If lropt > 1, investors will eventually borrow money to invest. High
demand for risky assets will lead to price increases and low demand
for riskless deposits to an increase in yields on safe bonds µrriskless.
Both effects reduce µrexcess. In addition, highly leveraged investments
are liable to margin calls and tend to increase volatility. The fall in
µrexcess and the rise in σ
r act to decrease lropt.
(b) If 0 < lropt < 1, there is no feedback. If we imagine leverage decreasing
from scenario (a), asset prices fall and bond yields drop as investors
withdraw from the market and move some of their resources to safe
deposits. Both effects increase µrexcess. Optimally leveraged invest-
ments require no borrowing, so volatility-increasing margin calls do
not occur. Thus the pressures in (a) bearing down on lropt are relaxed.
This regime is marginally stable.
(c) If lropt < 0, investors will eventually borrow stock to short-sell. Low
demand for risky assets will lead to price decreases and high demand
for riskless deposits to a decrease in yields on safe bonds µrriskless.
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Both effects make µrexcess less negative. Highly negatively leveraged
investments are liable to margin calls and tend to increase volatility.
The increase in µrexcess and the rise in σ
r imply that lropt becomes less
negative.
2. Global stability: It is difficult to envisage globally stable economies
existing with optimal leverage outside the interval 0 ≤ lropt ≤ 1 because:
(a) If lropt > 1, everyone should invest in the market more than he owns.
This is not possible because the funds to be invested must be provided
by someone.
(b) If lropt < 0, everyone should sell more market shares than he owns.
This is not possible because the assets to be sold must be provided
by someone.
Thus the range 0 ≤ lropt ≤ 1 is special in not being globally unstable.
We believe the above to be the main drivers behind stochastic efficiency. There
are additional effects, however, which reinforce it.
1. Economic paralysis: In an economy with lropt ≤ 0 there is no incentive
to invest in risky assets, which may limit productive economic activity.
Policy makers will tend to steer away from such conditions, perceiving
lropt = 1 as more desirable.
2. Covered short-selling: An investment with lr < 0 is punished by the
costs of borrowing stock to short-sell, i.e. covered as opposed to naked
short-selling.
3. Asymmetric interest rates: The interest received by a depositor is typ-
ically less than the interest paid by a borrower. Therefore, an investment
with lr < 1 is punished by low deposit interest rates and an investment
with lr > 1 is punished by high borrowing costs. This reinforces lropt = 1
as an attractive point.
4. Transaction costs: The costs of buying and selling assets (fees, market
spreads, and so on) punish any strategy that requires trading. Holding an
investment of constant leverage generally requires trading to rebalance the
ratio of assets to equity. The two exceptions are investments with lr = 0
and lr = 1.
Following these considerations we arrive at a refined hypothesis: on suffi-
ciently long time scales lropt = 1 is a strong attractor (which we refer to as
“strong” leverage efficiency). Deviations from this attractor are likely to be
confined to the interval 0 ≤ lropt ≤ 1 (“weak” leverage efficiency), whose end
points are sticky. In the following we submit this hypothesis to an empirical
test using market data.
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4 Tests of leverage efficiency in historical data
We test the leverage efficiency hypothesis by computing the growth rates of
constant-leverage investments in the Standard & Poor’s index of 500 leading
U.S. companies (S&P500) using its historical daily closing prices over the last
62 years.
4.1 Data sets
The data used in this study are publicly available from the Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED) website: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2. We use
the daily closing prices, adjusted for dividends and stock splits, of the S&P500
(FRED time series: SP500) from 4thAugust 1955 to 10th March 2017. Addi-
tionally we use the daily effective federal funds rate (FRED time series: DFF)
and the daily bank prime loan rate (FRED time series: DPRIME) over the
same period. The estimate of optimal leverage using these data is generous, as
the S&P500 represents a well-diversified portfolio of large and successful com-
panies, and – since bankrupt companies are replaced – is positively affected by
survivorship bias. All studies were repeated for Dow Jones Industrial Average
and NASDAQ data with essentially identical results (not shown).
4.2 Data analysis
The performance of an investment of constant leverage over a given time period,
or “window,” is computed as follows. At the start of the first day we assume unit
equity, comprising holdings of ld in the risky asset (S&P500) and cash deposits
of 1 − ld. At the end of the day the values of these holdings and deposits
are updated according to the historical market returns and interest rates. The
portfolio is then rebalanced, i.e. the holdings in the risky asset are adjusted so
that their ratio to the total equity remains ld. On non-trading days the return of
the market is zero, whereas deposits continue to earn interest payments, which
leads to an unrealistic but negligible rebalancing on those days. The investment
proceeds in this fashion until the final day of the window, when the final equity
is recorded. If at any time the total equity falls below zero, the investment
is declared bankrupt and the computation stops, i.e. we do not allow recovery
from negative equity. The optimal leverage, ldopt, is the leverage for which the
final equity is maximized. This is found using a golden section search algorithm
[Press et al., 2002, Chap. 9].
Figure 1 shows the total return (i.e. the effective fractional change from
start to finish) as a function of leverage for a hypothetical investment in the
S&P500 over the largest possible window, namely the entire time series. The
four curves in the figure correspond to four sets of assumptions about interest
rates and transaction costs, mentioned as additional effects in section 3. We list
these in order of increasing complexity and resemblance to actual conditions
and practices in financial markets:
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• Data analysis 1 (red line in figure 1) is the simple case, where the ef-
fective federal funds rate is applied to all cash, whether deposited or bor-
rowed. No costs are incurred for short-selling (ld < 0), akin to naked
short-selling, wherefore market returns apply to negative stock holdings
exactly as they apply to positive holdings. Transaction costs are neglected.
This results in a smooth curve.
• Data analysis 2 (yellow line) is like the first case, but federal inter-
est rates are paid on short positions, corresponding to fees for borrowed
stock. This penalization of negative holdings in the market introduces a
discontinuity in the derivative, or “kink,” at ld = 0.
• Data analysis 3 (green line) is like the second case, but now federal in-
terest rates are received on cash deposits, whereas prime interest rates are
paid on borrowed funds or stock. This resembles the effect of asymmetric
interest rates and introduces a kink at ld = 1.
• Data analysis 4 (blue line), the complex case, is like the third case, but
whenever the portfolio is rebalanced a loss in equity of 0.2% of the value
of the assets traded is incurred. This resembles transaction costs.
As discussed in section 3, covered short-selling, asymmetric interest rates,
and transaction costs tend to penalize investments with leverages other than 0
or 1. This is reflected in the empirical results by the kinks described above and
visible in figure 1. For many time windows the discontinuity in the derivative
of the return-leverage curve at ld = 0 or 1 is accompanied by a change in sign
of the derivative, making the point a global maximum and fixing ldopt there.
This likely corresponds to a real effect observed in real markets. However, even
without it, the red line shows that ldopt ≈ 1. This, being the simplest case with
the fewest assumptions and approximations, provides the strongest support for
our hypothesis.
4.3 The entire time series
The return-leverage curve for an investment window spanning the entire time
series over the last 62 years shows an optimal leverage of ldopt = 1.17 for the
simple case (data analysis 1) and ldopt = 1.00 for the complex case (data analysis
4). We discuss in section 4.6 the extent to which this confirms the hypothesis.
The time-average growth rate in equation (9), specific to the model in equa-
tion (7), is parabolic in lm. We show in figure 2 the time-average growth rate
for the simple case, which is the logarithm of the total return, shown in figure 1,
divided by the window length. Given the known deficiencies of the geometric
Brownian motion model, the parabolic fit (black dashed line) is remarkably good
within the range of the model’s validity. It is simultaneously remarkably bad
outside this range: daily rebalanced investments in the S&P500 with leverage
ld < −8.64 or ld > 4.89 would have been lost entirely (producing a negative di-
vergence in the logarithmic return) due to extreme events. For highly leveraged
9
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Figure 1: Return-leverage curves for the S&P500.
Total return from a constant-leverage investment in the S&P500, starting 4th
August 1955 and ending 10th March 2017, as a function of leverage. Data
analyses 1 (red), 2 (yellow), 3 (green), and 4 (blue). For descriptions of the
computations, see text, section 4.2.
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investors, the non-Gaussian tails of the return distribution, which determine
their ruin probability, are far more important than any other property.
The parameters of the fitted parabola are a fit of the model equation (9) and
can be taken as meaningful definitions of the empirical riskless drift µdriskless,
excess drift µdexcess, and volatility σ
d for the S&P500 over the last 62 years. A
least-squares fit estimates these parameters as µdriskless = 4.9% p.a., µ
d
excess =
2.9% p.a., and σd = 15.7% per square root of one year. We performed a one-
parameter fit, fixing the co-ordinates of the maximum and then fitting on the
range −7 ≤ ld ≤ 3. The meanings of these numbers warrant some remarks.
The riskless drift µdriskless is practically identical to the time-average growth rate
of a cash deposit over the 62-year window. However, the excess drift, µdexcess,
does not correspond to the excess growth rate of stock over cash. Instead,
due to the wealth-depleting effect of the volatility – manifested in the model
as −(lmσm)2/2 in equation (9) – a real investment in the S&P500 outgrows
federal deposits at only 1.7% p.a. over the window, which is less than the
excess drift. Investing almost entirely in stock, ld ≈ 1, proves growth-optimal
over this period: investments with higher leverage suffer the aforementioned
volatility penalty; while investments with lower leverage fail to exploit well the
outperformance of stocks relative to cash.
4.4 Equity premium puzzle
The term “equity premium” has been used to describe a form of compensation
investors demand for holding a risky asset. One way of quantifying the idea is
this: imagine you hold a riskless asset with a given time-average growth rate,
which you may swap for a risky asset with a given volatility; how much larger
must the risky asset’s time-average growth rate be to justify the swap?
The literature on this question is large and often takes a psychological and
individual-specific perspective. For instance, a more risk-averse individual will
demand a higher equity premium. Models of human behaviour enter both into
the definition of the equity premium – which lacks consensus [Ferna´ndez, 2009]
– and into its analysis. Much of the literature comes to the conclusion that dom-
inant behavioural models are inconsistent with the observed equity premium,
and this is known as the “equity premium puzzle” [Mehra and Prescott, 1985].
The framework we have developed here takes a psychologically na¨ıve perspec-
tive. We define the equity premium, pim, without reference to human behaviour
as the difference between the time-average growth rates of the risky (lm = 1)
and riskless (lm = 0) assets:
pim ≡ gmt (1)− gmt (0) (12)
= µmexcess −
(σm)2
2
. (13)
We ask what value we expect the equity premium to take in a real market.
Leverage efficiency dictates how large volatility must be for the market to avoid
a leverage instability (and, therefore, to survive so that we can ask the ques-
tion). Substituting equation (10) into equation (11) yields (σm)2 = µmexcess as
11
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Figure 2: Parabolic fit of leveraged time-average growth rate.
Computed time-average growth rates closely follow a parabola as a function of
leverage. The deviation from parabolic form for extreme leverages is due to
crashes and sudden recoveries. The 20.47% drop of 19 October 1987 leads to
bankruptcy (an infinitely negative logarithmic return) for leverage ld >= 4.89,
and the 11.58% rise of 13 October 2008 leads to bankruptcy for ld < −8.64,
showing the well-known asymmetry between negative and positive extreme
events.
an attractor. It follows from equation (13) that the equity premium is attracted
to
pim =
µmexcess
2
. (14)
Our analysis reveals this to be a very accurate prediction. The empirical eq-
uity premium – the rate at which the S&P500 outgrew federal deposits – was
pid = 1.7% p.a., close to our prediction of µmexcess/2 = 1.4% p.a.. We regard
the consistency of the observed equity premium with the leverage efficiency
hypothesis a resolution of the equity premium puzzle.
4.5 Central bank rate setting
Our observations are also relevant to the issue of setting a central bank’s lending
rate. The rate setter would view the total drift µr of an appropriate asset or
index as given, and the risk-free drift µrriskless as the central bank’s rate. If the
12
aim is to achieve full investment in productive activity without fuelling an asset
bubble, then this rate should be set so that lropt = 1. Since l
r
opt = µ
r
excess/(σ
r)2
and µrexcess = µ
r − µrriskless, this is achieved by setting
µrriskless = µ
r − (σr)2. (15)
Using µd and σd of section 4.3, the optimal interest rate comes out as 5.3%
p.a., a historically typical value. The task of the central banker can then be
seen as the task of estimating µr and σr in the relevant way. This will involve
choices about data and timescales which are far from trivial. For instance, in
our data analyses at any given time there is an estimate for µd and one for
σd for each possible length of lookback window. Operational matters aside,
stability with respect to leverage is an important consideration for any central
bank. Leverage efficiency provides a simple quantitative basis for a rate setting
protocol and may frame qualitative discussions about interest rates in a useful
way.
4.6 Shorter time scales
Using the full time series as our window we find an optimal leverage between
zero and one. How significant a corroboration of our hypothesis is this? Even
assuming that lropt is attracted to a particular value, we expect random devia-
tions from it to increase as the investment window gets shorter, since returns
over shorter windows are more heavily influenced by noise. To take an extreme
example, in the simple data analysis of a daily rebalanced portfolio, the observed
optimal leverage over a window of one day does not exist. Either ldopt → +∞
if the market beats the federal funds rate on that day; or ldopt → −∞ if federal
funds beat the market. Indeed, the magnitude of the observed optimal leverage
will diverge for any window over which the daily market returns are either all
greater than, or all less than, the daily returns on federal funds. This is unlikely
for windows of months or years but occurs commonly over windows of days or
weeks. The longest run of consecutive up-moves relative to the federal funds
rate in the S&P500 was 14 trading days from 26th March 1971 to 15th April
1971, and the longest draw-down relative to the federal funds rate was 12 trad-
ing days from 22nd April 1966 to 9th May 1966. Even without this divergence,
shorter windows are more likely to result in larger positive and negative optimal
leverages because relative fluctuations are larger over shorter time scales.
We quantify this idea in the model. Solving equation (7) yields the following
estimate for the time-average growth rate after a finite time ∆t:
ĝml (∆t,N = 1) = µ
m
riskless + l
mµmexcess −
(lmσm)2
2
+
lmσmW (∆t)
∆t
. (16)
Maximizing this generates an estimate for the optimal leverage over a window
of length ∆t:
l̂mopt(∆t,N = 1) = l
m
opt +
W (∆t)
σm∆t
. (17)
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Thus, in the model, optimal leverage for finite-time windows is normally dis-
tributed with mean lmopt and standard deviation
stdev(l̂mopt(∆t,N = 1)) =
1
σm∆t1/2
. (18)
To assess the significance of finding ldopt = 1.17 (or l
d
opt = 1.00 for the complex
data analysis), we estimate the time scale at which the standard deviation of
l̂dopt is 1, i.e. ∆t = (σ
m)−2. For shorter time windows a single measurement does
not corroborate significantly the assertion that ldopt is confined to a range of size
1. Substituting in the computed volatility σd = 15.7% per square-root of one
year fixes this time scale at around 40 years. However, to avoid over-reliance
on the specific form of the model, we test empirically the relation suggested by
equation (18).
Likening l̂mopt(∆t,N = 1) to the observed optimal leverage over a window
of size ∆t, we investigate how well equation (18) predicts the fluctuations in
ldopt(∆t). We compile histograms of l
d
opt(∆t) by moving windows of size ∆t
across the record and compare the standard deviation of ldopt(∆t) found in these
histograms to the standard deviation of l̂mopt(∆t,N = 1). For windows con-
siderably shorter than the entire record (months or a few years), the standard
deviations of the corresponding histograms are considered meaningful, and the
relation in equation (18) can be tested.
Figure 3 shows, on double-logarithmic scales, the standard deviation of ldopt
against the window length for the simple case. Good agreement is found with
the model-specific prediction in equation (18). We note that, for shorter time
scales, the standard deviation is slightly higher than predicted, which may have
to do with data discreteness and the divergence of optimal leverage for short
windows.
In figure 4 the diminishing fluctuations in ldopt are illustrated as follows: for
every day the optimal leverage is computed for the longest available window
(the window starting on 4th August 1955) for the simple and complex cases.
As time passes, the optimal leverage is seen to be consistent with an approach
to ldopt = 1. About one third of the measurements lie outside the one-standard
deviation band, as would be the case in the model. No measurements lie outside
the two-standard deviations band, whereas this would occur about 5% of the
time in the model. The period investigated could be atypical, but we attribute
the lack of large deviations to the inadequacy of the model equation (1): extreme
fluctuations in daily closing prices, whose likelihoods are underestimated by
equation (1), prohibit very large values of ldopt by causing bankruptcy. Our
prediction gets better, the fatter the tails of the empirical return distribution.
Figure 4 illustrates the convergence of ldopt → 1 over time, but provides no
information regarding the typicality of the time series. Further insight into the
dynamics of ldopt can be gained by examining time series for fixed window lengths.
Figure 5 (a) shows ldopt for the simple case for windows ranging from 5 years to
40 years as a function of the end date of the window. Figure 5 (b) shows the
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Figure 3: Standard deviation of observed optimal leverage.
The standard deviation of ldopt in the simple case (symbols) as a function of win-
dow length can be predicted based on the specific model equation (1) (straight
line), using the parameters found in section 4.3. Only non-overlapping windows
were used.
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Figure 4: Observed optimal leverage for an expanding window.
Daily optimal leverages for an expanding window, starting on 4th August 1955.
Also shown are the one- and two-standard deviation envelopes about ldopt = 1,
based on the estimate σd = 15.7% per square-root of one year in section 4.3.
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same for the complex case, which we claim is a more realistic representation of
market conditions and practices. From the strong fluctuations over short time
scales emerges attractive behavior consistent with both the strong and weak
forms of the leverage efficiency hypothesis. The effects of the stickiness of the
points ldopt = 0 and l
d
opt = 1 in the complex model are clearly visible and lend
additional support to both forms of the hypothesis as it applies to real markets.
4.7 A theory of noise
As well as providing estimates of the uncertainties in measurements of ldopt, the
analysis of section 4.6 sheds light on the existence and nature of “noise” in
financial markets [Black, 1986]. According to leverage efficiency, prices of risky
assets must fluctuate if an excess drift exists, µrexcess > 0, simply because the
market would otherwise become unstable. Furthermore, leverage efficiency tells
us the fluctuation amplitude required to avoid instability: (σr)2 = µrexcess. But,
if price fluctuations are necessary for stability, then the intellectual basis for
price efficiency – that changes in price are driven by the arrival of new economic
information – cannot be the whole truth. At least some component of observed
fluctuations must be driven by the leverage feedbacks described in section 3,
which enforce leverage efficiency and which have little to do with information
arrival.
Black [1986] differentiated between information-based and other types of
price fluctuation, referring to the latter as “noise” and regarding it as a symp-
tom of inaccurate information and market in-efficiency. However, the strong
empirical confirmation in figure 3 of the relation in equation (18) over a very
wide range of time scales – from weeks to decades – suggests that real prices have
fluctuation amplitudes close to the levels required for leverage stability. Their
fluctuations are, therefore, consistent with and predicted by leverage efficiency.
Prices “discovered” at ever higher trading frequencies will always show more
ups and downs, as seen in figure 3, but this noise is self-generated, imposed by
the requirement of leverage stability. That stability is the genesis of volatility
constitutes a theory of noise requiring no appeal to the arrival of unspecified
information, accurate or not.
5 Discussion
Nothing in nature, not even Brown’s pollen [Mazo, 2002], truly follows Brow-
nian motion, whether geometric or not. Nor is anything in nature knowably
faithfully described by any mathematical expression [Re´nyi, 1967]. However,
just as the movements of Brown’s pollen, in the appropriate regime, have some
properties in common with a Wiener noise, so the movements of share prices
have some properties in common with geometric Brownian motion. Specifically,
the daily excess returns for the markets investigated – like the fractional changes
in geometric Brownian motion – are sometimes positive and sometimes nega-
tive. For any time-window that includes both positive and negative daily excess
17
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Figure 5: Observed optimal leverage for fixed-length windows.
(a) In data analysis 1, see text, observed optimal leverage fluctuates strongly on
short time scales but appears to converge to ldopt = 1 on long time scales, which
constitutes the central result of the study. (b) In data analysis 4, see text, the
kinks in figure 1 ensure that ldopt = 0 and 1 are often found exactly. The 40-year
window supports the strong leverage efficiency hypothesis, lropt = 1, with a dip
to ldopt = 0 only after the financial crisis of 2008.
returns, regardless of their distribution, a well-defined optimal constant leverage
exists in our computations, section 4.2. We have investigated empirically the
properties of such optimal leverages.
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Stability arguments, which do not depend on the specific distribution of
returns and go beyond the model of geometric Brownian motion, led us to the
quantitative prediction that on sufficiently long time scales real optimal leverage
is attracted to 0 ≤ lropt ≤ 1 (or, in the strong form of our hypothesis, to lropt = 1).
We used specific properties of geometric Brownian motion to estimate the
time necessary to obtain a meaningful empirical test of this prediction. Over
short time scales, the fluctuations in ldopt are too large for a single measurement
of ldopt to falsify our hypothesis that it lies in a range of size 1. The model
predicts a required observation time scale of (σm)−2 ≈ 40 years, which estimate
we confirmed in the scaling of the standard deviation of ldopt in figure 3. We
therefore consider our main finding ldopt = 1.17 (or 1.00 in the complex case)
for the longest possible window of 62 years a significant corroboration of both
strong (lropt = 1) and weak (0 ≤ lropt ≤ 1) hypotheses. Both end points 0 and
1 are special due to the kinks in figure 1. The economic paralysis argument
suggests that lropt = 1 is a stronger attractor than l
r
opt = 0, and our observations
support this argument, especially the expanding window in figure 4 and the
40-year window in figure 5.
Leverage efficiency also suggests a fundamental explanation for the existence
of volatility in markets and, specifically, for its observed levels. Price fluctua-
tions are necessary to avoid leverage instability and their observed amplitude is
consistent with predictions that assume strong leverage efficiency, lropt = 1 , as
in figure 3. The corollary is that mainstream theories in which price fluctuations
are caused by the public disclosure of information or by market dysfunction are,
at best, incomplete. Trading at arbitrarily high frequencies will reveal structure,
but this structure does not necessarily have economic meaning beyond imposing
market stability.
The existence of optimal leverage is important conceptually, and its observed
value and associated stability arguments are of practical significance. While
these arguments do not preclude special conditions under which it is optimal to
invest more than one’s equity or to short-sell an asset, they give a fundamental
scale to leverage in general. In other words, if it appears that optimal leverage is
outside the band 0 ≤ lropt ≤ 1, then a special reason – such as insider knowledge
or a tax incentive – for this violation of leverage efficiency must exist. Artificially
maintaining such conditions will lead to instabilities. Consider housing: many
societies consider it desirable for an individual to be able to purchase a home
whose price exceeds his equity without having to take reckless risks. Without
carefully designed restrictions on speculative home purchases, policies which
aim to achieve the corresponding market conditions, i.e. lropt > 1, will defeat
their purpose and create investment bubbles followed by crashes.
Leverage efficiency is “accountable” in the sense of Popper [1982, Chap. I.2],
who demanded that a “theory will have to account for the imprecision of the
prediction”.1 Leverage efficiency predicts its own imprecision, equation (18),
1Popper does not refer to stochastic theories in this discussion. To apply his arguments to
our case, we replace “precision in the initial conditions” in his Chap. I.3 by “window length”.
Both concepts quantify the information available about the system.
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and the degree of its validity can be meaningfully and objectively tested. This
is particularly important given the complexity of the systems involved.
We emphasize that our work is in no way meant to advocate or evaluate
constant-leverage or any other investment strategies. Leverage efficiency is a
fundamental organizing principle for the stochastic properties of markets. The
data analysis in this study is an empirical test of this fundamental principle.
It has been argued that central banks, focusing their attention on interest
rates, pay insufficient attention to leverage [Geanakoplos, 2010]. Arguing in the
context of the model, a strong link between the two is equation (10): reduc-
ing the risk-free interest rate µmriskless (something we liken to the rate at which
governments lend) increases optimal leverage because, assuming that overall
drift µm does not change, it implicitly increases µmexcess by creating an incen-
tive to invest rather than save. This tends to lead to an eventual increase in
real leverage. We agree with the criticism in [Geanakoplos, 2010]: effecting
an increase (or decrease) in real leverage through a decrease (or increase) in
µrriskless is rather indirect. This appears problematic given how sensitive l
m
opt is
to µmriskless – an increase of µ
m
riskless by µ
m
excess (estimated at 2.9% p.a. over the
last 62 years) sets lmopt to zero, making it optimal to invest nothing. An increase
by about µmexcess/2, i.e. 1.5% p.a., is enough to remove any incentive to invest.
Conversely, a decrease of µmriskless by µ
m
excess doubles l
m
opt, generating instability.
Our results are relevant to the equity premium puzzle [Mehra and Prescott,
1985]. The equity premium, defined as the long-term outgrowth of the S&P500
compared to federal deposits, is 1.7% p.a.. This value is in line with our predic-
tion: given the fluctuations in stock returns and short-term government bond
returns the equity premium is such that optimal leverage converges to 1 in the
long run. From this perspective, only an equity premium violating leverage
efficiency would constitute a “puzzle” requiring further explanation.
We do not consider our arguments specific to financial markets. They are
relevant also to other regularly traded assets and commodities, related even to
such basic needs as food and shelter, such as the price of wheat or apartments
in Manhattan. They are relevant to macroeconomic decisions. Indeed, the
same type of dynamics – multiplicative growth with fluctuations – is at work
in many other systems. Equation (1) has been used to describe the growth of
populations in ecology [Lewontin and Cohen, 1969], the early spread of a disease
in epidemiology [Daley and Gani, 1999], and as the basis for the evolution of
cooperation [Peters and Adamou, 2015].
We have argued that 0 ≤ lropt ≤ 1 is a natural attractor for an economic
or market system, with the end points of the interval being sticky. We note
that a sticky lropt = 0 may correspond to a depression: in this case there is no
incentive to invest and to take risks. The aim of economic policy may be viewed
as creating conditions where lropt for the entire economy is within 0 ≤ lropt ≤ 1
and close to the upper bound. Recent observations in figure 5(a) suggest that
the policy response to the 2008 financial crisis has now somewhat overshot this
aim.
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